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ABSTRACT
Concepts drawn from the transaction costs literature are used to
analyze the governance structure of the transboundary water
treaty between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the Republic of South
Africa. The analysis shows that the two countries intended a
'relational' governance structure that supports the development of
ongoing sustainable relationships at minimum cost. The parties
gained economies of scale by using flexible language to resolve
controversial issues, establishing various neutral institutions to
police the treaty, and integrating benefits under the treaty with
existing economic arrangements between them.
I. INTRODUCTION
Scholarly discussion and public debate on the legal aspects of
shared natural resources have intensified in recent years. Even though the
'Helsinki Rules', worked out many years ago by the International Law
Association (ILA), have provided a useful background for a number of
declarations and treaties on transboundary water resources, the progres-
sive development of the law of transboundary water resources is still ham-
pered by difficulties in formulating uniform rules applicable to all nations.1
* The author is an Associate Professor of Agricultural Economics, Texas A&M
University. I would like to thank the following scholars for valuable comments on an earlier
draft: Professor Charles Marvin of Georgia State University, College of Law; Professor Ludwik
Teclaff of Fordham University School of Law; E. Wes F. Peterson, Professor, Department of
Agricultural Economics, University of Nebraska-Lincoln; Patrick Mclaniel, Lead Articles
Editor of the Natural Resources Journal. Editorial assistance by Linda S. Crenwelge, Texas
A&M University, is also appreciated. Al errors are mine.
1. The July, 1985 issue of the NAT. RESOURCES I., No. 3 (1985), was devoted to a
discussion of the laws and economics of transboundary natural resources. The symposium
was organized by Ludwik Teclaff of Fordham University, a leading scholar on this subject.
The various articles in the volume provide detailed references on this subject. See also,
TRANSBOUNDARY RESOUCE LAW (Albert Utton & Ludwik Teclaff eds., 1987). On the Helsinki
Rules, see International law Association Report of the 52nd Conference 484; Dante Caponera,
Patterns of Cooperation in International Water Law: Principles and Institutions, 25 NAT. RESOURCES
1. 563 (1985). The United Nations has been working hard to develop the laws on
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The reason, as one scholar points out, is that, "each river basin or system
has its own peculiarities and general rules of international law cannot cope
with such a differentiated reality."2 Despite the obstacles, there are good
reasons for the community of nations to strive to develop common rules
and guidelines for equitable and efficient sharing of water resources.
Transboundary natural resources are a major source of conflict and the
willingness of nations to abide by common rules may be an important
indicator of their willingness to work towards peaceful coexistence.3 Also,
as resources become increasingly scarce, increased pressure for sharing
could, in the absence of guidelines, lead to conflict. For developing
countries, arrangements and agreements to share natural resources may
one day become the rule rather than the exception, given the rather uneven
distribution of natural resources.4
This paper presents a general theoretical framework that may be
used to structure transboundary water treaties or other agreements.
Specifically, the paper uses a transaction costs theoretical framework to
discuss the content and implications of the bilateral treaty in force between
the Kingdom of Lesotho (KOL) and the Republic of South Africa (RSA).
transboundary resources. For example, see the two General Assembly Resolutions 34/186 of
18 December 1979, on "Cooperation in the field of the environment concerning natural
resources shared by two or more states, and on progress in the use made of the conclusion of
the study of the legal aspects concerning the environment related to offshore mining and
drilling within the limits of natural jurisdiction," and 37/217 of 20 December 1982 on
"[ijnternational cooperation in the field of the environment," requesting the Council to report
on the progress made in implementing the 1979 resolution. See Shared Natural Resources and
Legal Aspects of offshore Mining and Drilling: Report of the Executive Director, United Nations
Environment Program, U.N. GAOR, 13th Sess., Agenda Item 8, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/G.C.13/9/Add.1(1984) [hereinafter UNEP]. Also, since 1971, the International Law
Commission has been working on guidelines for "The Non-Navigational Uses of International
Water Courses," in response to the recommendation made by the General Assembly in its
Resolution 2669(XXV) of December 8, 1970. See [19851 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 68, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/Ser.A/1985/Add.1 (Part 2).
2. Caponera, supra note 1, at 587.
3. See Dominique Alheritiere, Settlement of Public International Disputes on Shared
Resources: Elements of a Comparative Study of International Instruments 25 NAT. RESOURc J. 701
(1985). See also Asit K. Biswas, Shared Natural Resources: Source of Conflict or Springs of Peace?
Dev. Forum, Sept.-Oct. 1982, at 13; BEN CRow ET AL., SHARING THE GANGES: THE PoLmcs AND
TECHNOGY Op RiE DEvEWPMENT (1995) (also provides insights on sharing transboundary
water resources).
4. "There are few places in the world where mankind has a more favorable opportunity
to adopt a constructive approach towards the problem of the common man, removing the
basic causes of conflict and war by the creation of abundance for all, than the field of such
shared water resources." BONAYA GODANA, AFRICA'S SHARED WATER RESOURCES 5 (1985). For
further insights on transboundary resource issues, see various editions of TRANSBOUNDARY
RESOURcES REPORT, published quarterly by the International Transboundary Resource Center,
University of New Mexico School of Law, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
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The treaty, the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), deals with a
project to transfer water from the highlands of Lesotho to the Republic of
South Africa.' The purpose of the present exercise is to highlight the
application of general concepts from the transaction costs literature that
may contribute to the progressive development of the international law of
transboundary natural resources.'
The structure of the water transfer treaty between KOL and the
RSA should be of special interest to scholars and policymakers interested
in advancing the frontiers of law regarding shared resources for two main
reasons. First, the two countries are markedly unequal in resource
endowment and stage of economic growth. Some writers sometimes refer
to KOL as a mere appendage of the RSA. Given this characterization of
KOL, it is important to ask whether a fair and equitable treaty to share
resources with a hegemonic RSA is possible. Second, the treaty was
negotiated and signed during the apartheid period in the RSA. This was a
period of turmoil in the southern cone of Africa, with the RSA coming
under intense political pressure to dismantle apartheid. The minority
regime carried out treaty negotiations under considerable uncertainty and
hard bargaining.7 However, the treaty has held up very well under the
5. This paper discusses the Treaty on the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, Oct. 24,
1986, Lesotho-S. Afr. [hereinafter Treaty], and a companion document entitled KINGDOM OF
LESOTHO MINISRY OF WATER, ENERGY AND MINING, LESOTHO HIGHLANDS WATER PROJECT
FEASmnTY STUDY MAIN REPORT (1985) (draft) [hereinafter Feasibility Study]. Because the
Treaty has not yet been registered with the United Nations Treaty Office, a reference to an
official treaty series or publication is not possible. A copy of the document was made
available to the author by His Excellency, William T. Van Tonder, the Ambassador from the
Kingdom of Lesotho to the United States, Washington, D.C.
6. Article 15 of the Statute of the International Law Commission (ILC) points out two
different aspects of the work of the ILC. The first aspect is the "codification of international
law," that is, "the more precise formulation and systematization of rules of international law
in fields where there already has been extensive State practice, precedent and doctrine," and
the second aspect is the "progressive development of international law," that is, "the
preparation of draft conventions on subjects which have not yet been regulated by
international law or in regard to which the law has not yet been sufficiently developed in the
practice of States." See IAN BROwNLEE, BASIC DOCUMEN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 221 (1967).
For a background discussion on Article 15 of the ILC Statute, also see HERBERT W. BRIGGS,
INTERNATIONAL LAw COMMIsSION (1965). See also TAsuM 0. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF
TREATIES (1974). Increasing resource scarcity and environmental pollution problems have
brought transboundary resource issues to the forefront of public debate. States' practice in
sharing natural resources is still evolving, and the applicable legal regime is progressively
being developed.
7. Since the treaty was negotiated during the old apartheid regime, the bargaining
strategies and debates reflect the thinking of the period. All apartheid laws were repealed in
1991, and an interim constitution ending minority rule was completed in 1993. A multiparty
election, open to all races was held in April 1994, with the African National Congress (ANC)
winning over 60% of the votes. Nelson Mandela was subsequently elected President of the
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historic political change that occurred in 1991 with the repeal of all
apartheid laws. As of 1996, there has been only one procedural amendment
to the treaty! Only two disputes have arisen, and these were amicably
resolved.9 Even though there has been no physical delivery of water, the
RSA has kept to its schedule in paying royalties as agreed upon under the
treaty.10
It is argued below that the water transfer treaty represents an
additional component in the historical relationship between the two
countries which, although characterized as one of hegemony, may be
shifting, albeit imperceptibly, to one that is "relational. " " The primary
RSA. No attempt is made to discuss the political relationships between RSA and its neighbors
since such a discussion is beyond the scope of this paper.
8. The amendment concerns the commencement date for water delivery to RSA. The
Treaty stipulates the water delivery date from Phase IA as January 1, 1995, which would also
be followed by payments of royalties. To take into account the delays in the commencement
of the Project, particularly the delay in signing the Treaty, an amendment was made in
Protocol IV, in terms of which the fixed royalty component becomes payable to Lesotho upon
the water level in Katse reservoir reaching 1,993 meters above sea-level (this level was reached
on September 6,1996), and the actual water delivery should commence before January 1,1997.
A new date, likely to be January 1998, for the delivery of water is being discussed by the two
countries in view of the need to line the entire transfer tunnel, an activity which was not
planned for under the original Treaty. See communication from Pule Nthejane, Esq.,
Counsellor, Embassy of the Kingdom of Lesotho, to Fred 0. Boadu, Associate Professor, Dep't
of Agricultural Economics, Texas A & M University, 1-2 (Oct. 25, 1996) [hereinafter
Communication].
9. There have been two disputes to date. One dispute concerns Article 10(3) of the
Treaty relating to whether income tax chargeable in Lesotho constitutes a cost for which the
RSA is responsible. KOL's interpretation of the clause is that income tax is part of legitimate
project costs, while RSA's interpretation is the opposite. In 1993, the Parties had to decide
whether to submit the issue to arbitration or to settle it amicably. The Parties decided to work
on a compromise solution, in terms of which KOL has agreed to charge lower rates of taxation
to contractors and consultants working on the Project, while RSA has accepted the lower taxes
as legitimate Project costs for which it will bear cost responsibility. The agreement is to be
embodied in Protocol V to the Treaty, intended for signature before the end of 1996. The other
dispute concerns hydrology, that is, on the amount of water available in Lesotho. The dispute
dates back to 1983, and several attempts to resolve the issue have to date not succeeded.
However, the latest round of talks between the hydrologists of the two countries is promising
some positive outcome. See Communication, supra note 8, at 2.
10, The first royalty payment is due at the end of October 1996, even though water has
not yet been delivered. See text accompanying supra note 7; see Communication, supra note 8,
at Z
11. For a discussion of the concept of "relational treaties" see infra Part II. One indicator
of the dependency thesis is the number of migrant workers from Lesotho to South African
mines. During the 1970s migrants comprised, on the average, 30 percent of Lesotho's active
work force and close to 50 percent of the active males. Migrant remittances have financed
some 80 percent of the country's real growth since the 1960s and are now at least as large as
the gross domestic product (GDP). See, e.g., Paul A. Wellings, Modern Sector Development and
South African Investment: A Viable Strategyfor Lesotho? I J. oF AniucAN S Dms 4, 13 (1986).
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thesis posed in this paper is that the KOL-RSA Water Treaty has great
potential as a model for discussion of joint transboundary natural resource
development and exploitation. Furthermore, the treaty shows how such
international agreements might be structured to promote ongoing
productive relationships with a minimum of dysfunctional provisions.
To give credence to the thesis posed in this paper, one has to
understand the relationships between KOL and RSA in terms of physical
location, historical economic and political interaction, and most
importantly the distribution of water resources in the sub-region. Lesotho
is completely surrounded by RSA and has no access to the rest of the world
except through the Republic. The Senqu River, a major river in Lesotho,
originates from the highlands in Lesotho and joins the Orange River in
South Africa to become the Senqu-Orange River System. Water from the
highlands in Lesotho constitutes 50 percent of the input into the Senqu-
Orange River System.u The direction of flow of the Senqu River poses
Also a recent United Nations report suggested that the "Highlands power and water project
would-by definition-not alter [the dependency] status of Lesotho as South Africa is the
basic customer for the water and, at full development of potential, the power." See United
Nations: Inter-Agency Task Force, Africa Recovery Programmed Economic Commission for
Africa, South African Destabilization: The Economic Cost of Frontline Resistance to
Apartheid, UN Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 36 (October 1989).
The primary issue of interest in this paper is not whether South Africa has engaged in obtuse
behavior in the past or not. That is conceded. This paper contends that this historical fact
should not drown the potential for exploring possible pareto-superior distribution of shared
resources. The concept of pareto-superior builds on the related concept of pareto-efficiency,
which is defined as "a situation in which everyone is so well-off that it is impossible to make
anybody better off without simultaneously making at least one person worse off. It is a
situation in which all possibilities for voluntary trades which would re-allocate resources or
redistribute commodities more efficiently have been exhausted." See ALAN RANDALL,
RESuRcEECONOMIC AN ECNOMICAPPROACHTO NATURALRESOURCE ANDENVIRONMEINTAL
Poucy 104 (2d ed. 1987).
12. See Feasibility Study supra note 5, for a description of the geography of Lesotho,
projected water needs of the Republic of South Africa. Maps of the project area are taken from
the Feasibility Study supra note 5. For detailed studies on the water resources of Lesotho, see
QAL NK.CHAKLSEcRErAMATFORWRMIATONECOUGYSWEM ,WATERANDSOM
REsouRc S OF LESMTHO, 1935-1970: A REvmw AND BIBUOGRAPHY (1973); QALABANE K.
CHAKEtA, SCANDINAVIAN INSmnnrm OF AIPdcAN STUrmss, UPPSALA Som. EROSION AND
REsiRvout SEDIvENTATON IN LeSormo, UNGI Nr 54 Rapport (1981). What is known as the
Orange River Basin is defined by a series of rivers and lakes. These are the Orange River
forming the Namibia and South African border, the Mossob River forming the Botswana and
South African border, the Molopo River also forming another Botswana and South African
border, the Caledon River forming a Lesotho and South African border, and tributaries of the
Orange forming another Lesotho and South African border. In effect, South Africa, Namibia,
Botswana and Lesotho are the constituent countries of the Orange River Basin, which is
950,000 square kilometers (km2) in area. Sixty-six percent of South Africa's land area falls
within the basin and the whole of L.esotho (100 percent of land area) is considered within the
basin. See CENRE FOR NATURAL REsOuRCES, ENERGY & TRANSPORT OF TH DEp'T OF ECONONiC
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problems for South Africa because the water flows south into the Orange
River, when it is needed north of the Drakensberg Range in the Vaal River
above the Vaal Dam (see Map). The Vaal Region, also called the "Pretoria-
Witwatersand-Vereeniging (PWV)" area, is critical to the economy of South
Africa. The area accounts for approximately 40 percent of South Africa's
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and about 50 percent of its total industrial
output, with 31 percent of the total population living in the area. Water
demand in the PWV area in South Africa was projected to exceed supply
by 1995. Water deficits were projected to grow from 1.81 m3 per second
(/s) in 1995 to 106.69 m3/s by the year 2030 due largely to growth in
industrial and household demand.D Given the importance of the PWV area
to South Africa, there is a critical need to address this projected deficit in
water demand. The solution is the transfer of water from Lesotho to the
PWV region under the LHWP.14
To accomplish the water transfer objective, KOL and RSA agreed
to an elaborate engineering undertaking under the LHWP. The LHWP is
comprised of four dams, from which water from Lesotho would be carried
a distance of over 400 km to the Vaal Dam through several tunnels, the
longest being 53 km. The first stage of construction began in 1987 and the
first water was projected to reach the Vaal Dam in 1995, but the delivery
AND SOcIAL AFFAIRS OF THE UNrrED NATIONS, REGISTER Op INTERNATIONAL RIVERS 6,22-23,
27(1978).
13. Feasibility Study supra note 5, at 3-5. Midgley has suggested the need to restructure
RSA's water price regime along efficiency lines in order to deal with recurring water deficits.
See D. C. Midgley, Towards a Rational Water Polcy for South Africa 2 Optima (ZA) 33,50-60
(June 1985). However, the structural characteristics of RSA's water economy show that more
than a restructuring of the price regime will be needed to deal with the water deficits. On the
supply side, "only about 9% of the total population appears as stream flow. The balance 91%
disappears mainly into the atmosphere by evaporation and transpiration." D. F. Kokot, Water
Utilisation, in STANDARD ENCYcWPEDIA oF Sotmi AFRICA, NASIONALE OPVOEDKUNDIGE
UITGENERY LTD. (vol. 111975). To underscore the water-poverty of RSA, Kokot provides
the following examples: the Tennessee River, with a catchment area of about one-twelfth of
the area of RSA, has a run-off equal to that of all the rivers of RSA. Another river in the United
States, the Columbia, with a drainage area of 190,000 km2, has double the run-off of RSA with
an area of 1,222,000 km2. Id. at 356. On the demand side, the author points out, "in 1970,
agriculture was responsible for 78% of total water consumption as against 22% for domestic
and industrial use. By the end of the century, agriculture will be only 44% of the total." Id. The
water deficiency in the PWV area is, in effect, the result of the hydrological cycle and not a
failure to price water efficiently to industry and agriculture.
14. For a summary of Lesotho's stake in the water project, see the Feasibility Study, supra
note 5, at i; and Treaty, supra note 5, at 15. See also Africa Inst. of South Africa, University of
Lesotho, 24 Lesotho: Highlands Water Project in Balance 113 (1984). Also since 1988, the
Government of Lesotho has been issuing very informative annual progress reports on the
water transfer project Copies of these reports are available from the Lesotho Embassy based
in Washington, D.C.
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never occurred."5 The final stage would be completed in 2019 with a
delivery of 70 m3/s. Both South Africa and Lesotho will benefit from
LHWP. According to the feasibility study carried out under the project, the
cost of LHWP is about 50 percent of the estimated cost of an alternative
proposed project, the Orange-Vaal Transfer System (OVTS), located
entirely within South Africa. 6 This cost savings will be apportioned
between Lesotho and South Africa, with Lesotho receiving an annual fixed
payment (annuity) of about US $13.6 million."
In addition to the direct benefits from royalty payments, the
feasibility study points to indirect benefits for Lesotho. For example, part
of the project package is to develop a hydroelectric power plant in Lesotho
with an initial capacity of 73.4 Million-Watts (MW) in 1995 and increasing
to a maximum of 276 MW in 2021.18 It is estimated that, a hydroelectric
plant based in Lesotho would save the kingdom about US $5.1 million in
1995, rising to about US $23.4 million in 2044.19 In addition, benefits from
agro-industry growth, increased forestry, additional fisheries, and
expansion of tourism are anticipated. Moreover, since the mountain region
is very sparsely populated, the development will affect only some 4,000
hectares of arable land and 18,700 hectares of grazing land, with about 273
households being displaced.' Given the positive benefits of the project
identified in the feasibility studies, the task facing the two countries was
reduced to designing an agreement that allowed them to capture the
identified benefits. The rest of the paper explores how KOL and RSA
structured their treaty in order to capture these benefits. Section II presents
a theoretical and analytical approach to be used in analyzing the treaty,
drawn from the transaction costs paradigm of institutional economics.
Section ill presents details of the procedural and substantive elements of
15. See text accompanying supra note 8.
16. See Feasibility Study, supra note 5, at 4-7. See also text accompanying infra note 52.
17. See id. at 10-3.
18. See id. at 5-10.
19. See id. at 10-4.
20. See id. at 7-3, 7-4. In 1987, Dieter Schumacher, a consultant from the United Nations
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and Moleboheng Ramoreboli of the Lesotho
National Development Corporation (LNDC) identified several agricultural and tourism
industries with linkages to the project. Even though these projects have gone through
modifications, a report issued by the authors in 1996 gives the following breakdown of
achievements for agricultural projects in terms of completion targets: mountain horticulture
and field crops (90%); fisheries (80%); community forestry (50%); dairy programme (65%);
poultry (0%/); animal husbandry and range management (25%). The Lesotho authorities find
the progress to-date quite satisfactory. See DW= SCHUMACHER & MOLEBOHENG RAMOREBOMU,
MANUFACTURING LINKGEs FROM PHASE I: LSOTHO HIGHLANDS WATER PROiECT, (Lesotho
National Dev. Corp., Information Paper No. 4,1987); also LEOO HiHiLAND DEVELOPMENT
AurtoRrrY, Pus. No. 68, QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT (1996).
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the treaty within the framework developed in Section II, and Section IV
presents conclusions.
1. A PARADIGM OF RELATIONAL AND TRANSACTIONAL
TREATIES
The theoretical and analytical approach used to analyze the KOL-
RSA treaty draws from the transaction costs paradigm of institutional
economics.'1 Although the paradigm was initially applied to the contractual
difficulties facing firms, in recent literature it has increasingly gained wider
application in an effort to explain the variety of institutions that have
evolved to guide international interactions.' The basic idea under the
21. The paradigm used in this study was inspired by studies from the transaction-costs
literature. The principal two studies are: Ian F. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contract 47 S.
CAL. L REv. 691 (1974) thereinafter Many Futures], and Ian R. Macneil, Adjustments of Long-
Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law 72 Nw U. L.
REV 854 (1978) [hereinafter Adjustments]. See also Oliver Williamson, Transaction Cost
Economics; The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & EcON. 233 (1979); Charles Goetz
& Robert Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089 (1981); Timothy Muris,
Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. LREV. 521 (1981); Anthony Kronman,
Contract Law and the State of Nature, 1 J.L ECON. & ORG. 5 (1985); and Victor Goldberg, Toward
an Expanded Economic Theory of Contract, 10 J. ECON. ISSUEs 45 (1976).
22. Beth Yarbrough and Robert Yarbrough have applied the transaction costs paradigm
to international institutions in several interesting papers. See, e.g., Beth & Robert Yarbrough,
Institutions for the Governance of Opportunism in International Trade, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 129
(1987); Beth & Robert Yarbrough, Free Trade, Hegemony and the Theory of Agency, 38 Kyklos 345
(1985). Lord McNair has explained the parallels between the concept of a contract and a treaty
as follows:
In spite of the variety in its objects, it is obvious that the treaty as a concept
of international law has been mainly indebted in the course of its
development to the agreement or contract of private law. In the case of a
contract, English law requires that there must be a common intention of the
parties to enter into legal obligations, mutually communicated expressly or
impliedly, and will be binding insofar as such an intention is known when
parties enter into an agreement which in other respects conforms to the rules
of law as to the formation of contracts. A corresponding rule applies to
treaties, and the inference of intention referred to is even more important in
the case of treaties because it sometimes happens that of two governments
who conclude a treaty one at any rate has no intention of creating a legal
obligation or of performing what it has promised to do.;eb LoRD McNAIR,
THE LAW OF TREATIES 6 (1965).
Also, according to Sir Hersch Lauterpacht;
the legal nature of private law contracts and International law treaties is
essentially the same. The autonomous will of the parties is, both in contract
and in treaty, the constitutive condition of a legal relation which, from the
moment of its creation, becomes independent of the discretionary will of one
of the parties. It is the law of the state which gives objective force to a
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paradigm is that parties weigh the benefits and costs of entering into a
treaty or agreement, and therefore would search for the appropriate
organizational structure (governance regime) which minimizes the cost of
their participation in a treaty.' Governance regimes can be looked at on a
continuum, ranging from a single, 'one-shot' interaction to a long-term
repeated interaction. Parties may define their interaction to reflect a hybrid
of these two extreme poles. The transaction costs paradigm provides a
framework for analyzing the choice of governance regime used by
contracting parties to govern their interaction.
In the context of international treaties, 'transaction costs' refer to
those costs associated with interactions between nations. These include
"information, contracting and policing costs (ICP)."' Information cost in
negotiating a treaty could be quite high. For example, parties need to know
about each other's outlook, behavior, intent, desire to deal in good faith,
and willingness to abide by negotiated commitments.' They include an
understanding of the history, culture, politics, and the entire social matrix
within which the parties function. Parties also need to have information
about the technical and economic characteristics of the subject matter or
object of the treaty. Gathering and processing this information is costly.
Several options are available to deal with information costs. For example,
each party may decide to incur information gathering and processing costs
independently of the other's actions. On the other hand, the parties may
freely trade information, conduct collaborative research, or jointly engage
the services, of third parties where the subject matter may not be within
their competence.
Parties to a treaty incur contracting, or bargaining, costs in order
to maximize benefits by reducing their risks and avoiding being victims of
opportunism.' Each party in a negotiation attempts to obtain concessions
contract in private law, and it is the rule pacta sunt sermandaLl (treaties are
binding) one of the fundamental of international law, which imparts
objective force to international treaties.
SIR HERScH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURcES AND ANALOGS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
WiTH SPECIAL REFERENCE T INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 156 (1970).
23. See Williamson, supra note 21, at 233.
24. A. MmRELLPovn AN DTRODIcnON TO LAw AND ECONOMICS 12 (1983). See also
Thomas Crocker, Externalities, Property Rights and Transaction Costs: An Empirical Study, 14 J.
L & ECON. 451 (1971).
25. Sources supra note 21, provide information on these characteristics.
26. Opportunism has been defined as:
When a performing party behaves contrary to the other party's
understanding of their contract, but not necessarily contrary to the
agreement's explicit terms, leading to a transfer of wealth from the other
party to the performer .... Because of the wealth transfer, parties have an
incentive to avoid becoming victims of opportunism, yet whatever strategy
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from the other party through bargaining. The concessions obtained become
a part of the treaty. The process is time consuming and, depending on the
ultimate goal of the contracting parties, costs associated with the process
can be substantial For example, it is very costly to reduce every minute
detail of a treaty to writing since future contingencies are difficult to pre-
dict.' Even if the parties are able to come up with a list of reasonable future
contingencies, they must negotiate on each one. Such negotiation can be
very lengthy because one party may behave strategically or adopt 'hold
out' tactics. It is not inconceivable that tactics used by one or bo h parties
may thwart a potentially beneficial treaty. ' In contrast, parties may deli-
berately follow a cooperative approach in order to reduce bargaining costs
and capture economies." Techniques such as 'good faith' bargaining and
'best effort' to arrive at a mutually beneficial conclusion help reduce
transaction costs Also, parties may jointly reduce costs by deferring
difficult issues for future deliberation using mechanisms such as "agree-
of self-protection they choose, deterrence will be costly. Thus, for a given
amount of opportunism avoided, an individual will choose the least costly
method or combination of protective methods.
Muris, supra note 21, at 521.
27. Macneil defined the phenomenon as "presentiation." See Macneil, supra note 21, at
863. "Presentiation" refers to efforts on the part of parties in a transactional contract to reduce
all future contingencies to the present. Id. The phenomenon is inapplicable in a relational
contract. Id.
28. See RICHARD BILDER, MANAGING THE RISKS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT 11, 24
(1981). A reviewer brought to my attention the relevance of "prisoner's dilemma" issues in
this type of contracting. Even though game-theoretic approaches to treaty negotiation have
not been discussed in this paper, their relevance to the current discussion should not be
overlooked. For example, embedded within the concept of "opportunism" is the idea of a
"game". Opportunism includes bluffs, threats, and games of "chicken" designed to exploit
another party's presumed bargaining disadvantage. Goetz & Scott, supra note 21, at 1101. A
relational treaty concerning a transboundary resource is analogous to the outcome of a game
that is repeated an indefinite number of times and where both parties are interested in
sustained ongoing payoffs in the future. For these repeated games, both parties have an
incentive to cooperate. For further insights on the game-theoretic approaches, see ROBERT
AXELKOD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). See also ALVIN E. ROTH ED., GAME-
THEORETIC MODELS OF BARGAINING (1985). Runge has suggested that in the international
arena, the popular "prisoner's dilemma" game may not be applicable. The author has labeled
the negotiation problem in the international arena as an "assurance problem," In this case the
solution lies in searching for a common mutual contract of cooperation that is assured by an
institutional rule to which every player conforms. See Carlisle Ford Runge, Institutions and the
Free Rider: The Assurance Problem in Collective Action, 46 J. POL 154 (1984).
29. According to Goetz & Scott, "[plarties enter into relational contracts because such
agreements present an opportunity to exploit certain economies. Each party wants a share of
the benefits resulting from these economies and consequently seeks to structure the
relationship so as to induce the other party to share the benefits of the exchange." Goetz &
Scott, supra note 21, at 1092.
30. See BILDER, supra note 28.
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ments to agree or tacit agreements or they may establish joint committees
or other procedures to attempt to implement their cooperative objective." 3'
Policing costs are costs incurred to ensure performance by the
other party. 2 Parties may renege on their commitment in several ways
including outright refusal to perform, performance below a required
standard, shirking of responsibility, or engaging in opportunistic
behavior.5 A treaty may contain both explicit and implicit mechanisms to
ensure performance. Methods of dispute resolution which are stated in a
treaty document, and, sometimes, trading of 'hostages' are examples of
explicit mechanisms to ensure performance.' Implicit policing mechanisms
include provisions defining nonperformance or inadequate performance,
rewarding full performance, decreasing the probability of the other party
gaining from nonperformance, or making nonperformance more costly, by
tying or linking benefits under the agreement to other existing or future
benefit in a different treaty between the parties. 5
The characterization of a treaty as 'transactional' or 'relational'
depends on decisions made by parties to economize on information,
bargaining, and policing costs. In a transactional interaction, information
on the identity of parties is immaterial because parties are not planning for
a long-term ongoing relationship.' Since parties in a transactional
interaction may not know each other, each incurs independent costs to
insure against the lack of credibility of the other party, conducts
independent studies on the technical aspects of the object of the interaction,
engages in strategic bargaining which may tie-up the process in minute
details, and when disputes arise, may resort to costly lawsuits, seeking
damages or court-ordered performance. 7
In contrast, the identity of parties in a relational interaction is
material because the parties seek a long-term progressive development of
relations.' To avoid future conflict, the parties in a relational interaction
31. Id.
32. See POuNSKI, supra note 24, at 5.
33. See BILDR, supra note 28.
34. Id.; see also Yarbrough & Yarbrough, supra note 22.
35. See BIIDER, supra note 28.
36. Macneil, supra note 21, at 720-21. "The transactional contract is described as "sharp
in by clear agreement sharp out by clear performance." Id. at 738; compare with text
accompanying supra, note 27.
37. As Macneil points out, "Should the initial presentation fail to materialize because of
nonperformance, the consequences are relatively predictable from the beginning and are not
open-ended." Macneil, supra note 21, at 864.
38. "The fiction of discreteness [transaction] is fully displaced as the relation takes on the
properties of a 'mini-society with a vast array of norms beyond those centered on the
exchange and its immediate processes." Williamson, supra note 21, at 238, quoting Macneil,
supra note 21.
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work towards a common understanding of the subject matter of their
interaction through voluntary trading of information, replace costly
strategic bargaining on minute details with a focus on developing a long-
term stable relationship, and when disputes arise, remedies tend to take
"the restorational form of negotiation, mediation, arbitration, orders to do
things and other processes fostering cooperation, rather than substitutional
monetized remedies."'
The above discussion hardly exhausts the many distinctions
between the characteristics of a relational versus transactional governance
structure. Two key points must be kept in mind. First, the determination
of a relational or transactional governance structure is based on the nature
of an interaction in its entirety and not based on a concatenation of isolated
elements of an agreement. Second, the long-term nature of an agreement
does not necessarily imply a relational governance structure. 4" Rather, it is
the deliberate and purposive effort on the part of parties to economize on
costs and share benefits through cooperative undertakings that define a
relational interaction. Did KOL and RSA achieve a relational governance
outcome in their treaty to share the benefits from the Orange River basin
development? We argue below that they did, and the treaty could be a
useful example for other countries contemplating a transboundary water
treaty.
III. APPLICATION OF THE TRANSACTION COST PARADIGM TO
THE KOL-RSA TREATY
The essence of the characterization of a contract as transactional or
relational is "to categorize contract transactions and relations along some
kind of behavioral lines."" This means that by carefully examining the
39. Macneil, Many Futures, supra note 21, at 864.
40. Goetz and Scott have explained the implication of length of contract as follows:
although a certain ambiguity has always existed, there has been a tendency
to equate the term "relational contract" with long-term contractual
involvements. We here adopt a very specific construction of the term that is
based more precisely on a contrast with the classical contingent contract. A
contract is relational to the extent that the parties are incapable of reducing
important terms of the arrangement to well-defined obligations. Such
definitive obligations may be impractical because of inability to identify
uncertain future conditions or because of inability to characterize complex
adaptations adequately even when the contingencies themselves can be
identified in advance... long-term contracts are more likely than short-term
arrangements to fit this conceptualization, but temporal extension per se is not
the defining characteristic.
Goetz & Scott, supra note 21, at 1091.
41. Macneil, Many Futures, supra note 21, at 736.
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language, duties, and responsibilities in a treaty, one may gain an
understanding of the parties' aspirations, hopes, and the choice of
governance regime intended to govern the distribution of benefits between
the present and the future. Where the language, duties, and responsibilities
convey a sense of a 'one-shot' deal, the parties intended a transactional
treaty, and where there is a sense of continuity and conscious effort to
jointly minimize costs by reducing risks and avoiding opportunism, a
relational treaty is intended. In the sections below, we examine the
substantive language and procedural mechanisms in the KOL-RSA treaty
to determine how the parties made conscious choices regarding the sharing
of information, the conduct of bargaining, and imposition of policing
mechanisms in an effort to reduce risk and avoid opportunism. Based on
the conclusions reached about parties' choices, inferences will be made as
to whether a relational or transactional governance structure was intended.
a. Information Costs
In negotiating the treaty, KOL and RSA took joint action to reduce
information costs, thus indicating a mutual desire to work towards a
relational governance structure. They accomplished this in two ways: (1)
by incorporating and building on the historical commonalities between the
two countries rather than a costly search for new sources of trust and (2) by
a joint undertaking to share the information cost for all the technical and
non-technical aspects of the treaty. A good example of a conscious effort on
the part of the parties to reduce information costs is the manner in which
they utilized their common historical institutional origins in designing the
dispute resolution mechanism under the treaty.
Despite being politically separate entities, KOL and RSA share
much common cultural and historical background. In addition to the
geographical proximity and historical political interaction, KOL shares
some common legal traditions with RSA. By a proclamation in 1884,
Roman Dutch Common Law (South African) became a part of KOL's
common law so that KOL's legal system today includes both English and
Dutch Common Law principles.' The two nations built on their common
42. The General Law Proclamation of May 29, 1884, stated: "[ijn all suits, actions or
proceedings, civil or criminal, the law to be administered shall, as nearly as the circumstances
of the country will permit, be the same as the law for the time being in force in the colony of
the Cape of Good Hope..." Sebastian Poulter, The Common Law in Lesotho, XIII, 13 J. AFR. L.
127-28 (1969); see also James Beardsley correspondence 14 J. AmR L. 198-202 (1970) (respond-
ing to Poulter's article). As Poulter points out, this proclamation is exceptional in that even
though Lesotho, then Basutoland, was a British protectorate, Roman-Dutch law rather than
English Common law was introduced. Poulter, id. For excellent discussions of the common
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legal heritage in developing the rules of arbitration under the treaty. The
treaty text is the basic law to be applied by the Arbitral Tribunal. For the
interpretation or application of the treaty, however, the Arbitral Tribunal
may use the following sources in the order in which they are listed: a) inter-
national agreements entered into by both parties; b) customary inter-
national law universally recognized or having received the assent of both
parties; c) Roman Dutch customary law; and d) all such other rules of law
in force in both the Kingdom of Lesotho and the Republic of South Africa.
KOL and RSA also took joint action to reduce the cost of
information about the project itself, primarily through joint research and
feasibility studies. Negotiation for the transfer of water from Lesotho to the
Republic of South Africa has been ongoing for over three decades. The first
study was undertaken for the Government of Basutoland in 1955-1956."
The current treaty is based on a feasibility study completed in 1987, and
sponsored jointly by RSA and KOL in order to avoid the high cost of
separately funded studies. Although each party engaged the services of
internationally recognized experts on water basin development, the experts
worked together to produce a single document.'
The treaty addressed both the logistical and engineering aspects of
the water transfer and the implications of the project for tourism, fisheries
development and water-related recreational activities in Lesotho, as well
as the water needs issues in the PWV area in RSA. The collaborative spirit
in which the parties gathered information about the treaty is a reflection of
the relational governance preference of the parties. By going beyond the
mere logistics of a water transfer scheme to address issues of domestic
policy interest to the parties, the parties obtained cost economies, thereby
law in Lesotho and the influence of South African Roman-Dutch principles, see Poulter, id.
at 127-44; see also Beardsley, supra this note (1970).
43. Note that the rules of arbitration suggested in the KOL-RSA Treaty capture both the
neutral international guidelines and the Roman-Dutch customary principle shared by KOL
and RSA. See Poulter, supra note 41. For example, Article I of the Model Rules on Arbitral
Procedure requires Parties to bring disputes about arbitration to the International Court of
Justice to be resolved by "means of its summary procedure." Report of the Commission to the
General Assembly [19581,2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 83.
44. Bruce S. Young, Projected Hydroelectric Scheme in Basutoland, 60 J. GEOGRAPHY 225-27
(1961) citing NINHAM SHAND, REPORT ON THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENr OF THE WATER
RESOURCES OF BAsuTrOtAND (1956). Prior to independence in 1966, Lesotho was known as
Basutoland. Id.
45. The government of Lesotho engaged the services of the Lahmeyer MacDonald
Consortium consisting of Lahmeyer International GmbH, Sir M. MacDonald and Partners,
Ltd. and the Electricity Supply Board of Ireland. South Africa engaged the services of the
Olivier Shand Consortium consisting of Ninham Shand, Inc. and Henry Olivier and
Associates. All the organizations are internationally recognized. See Feasibility Study, supra
note 5, at preface.
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avoiding another costly investigation or simply not addressing the
problems.*
b. Bargaining Costs
A relational governance structure requires that parties avoid cost-
increasing bargaining techniques like hold-outs, risk increasing techniques
in the form of ambiguities in language, and opportunism, promoting
techniques like open-ended drafting of provisions. A basic strategy used
by RSA and KOL to reduce bargaining costs was the reliance on
independent, internationally recognized experts, and the conscious
decision to follow guidelines suggested by the international community of
nations. By following the guidelines suggested by the United Nations, the
KOL-RSA treaty gives credence to the usefulness of general principles.4 In
46. It is not possible to identify the economic development policies of the government
of Lesotho in a single document. Statements of policies are found in various development
plans, position papers, official pronouncements and speeches by various government officials.
Joshua Carpenter has summarized the general intent of the government of Lesotho to: (1) give
agriculture the highest priority; (2) develop small scale industries; (3) emphasize primary
education; (4) exploit the water and mineral resources of the country; and (5) promote
effective local government. Joshua Carpenter, A Critique of Economic Development Planning
Since World War II: Selected African Case Studies (1977) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Colorado State University) (on file with author).
47. In 1984, the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) requested, from
governments and international organizations, information on how the United Nations
"Principles of Conduct in the Field of the Environment for the Guidance of States in the
Conservation and Harmonious Utilization of Natural Resources Shared by Two or More
States" was being applied. UNEP, supra note 1, at 4. Lesotho was one of forty-six countries
that expressed a commitment to implement U.N. General Assembly Resolution 37/217. Id. at
1. In reply to requests for information submitted by the UN Secretariat, the Government of
Lesotho stated:
Lesotho expects to draw upon the principles (dranm by the UN) during
negotiations with South Afri currently under uray regarding the transfer of waters
from the Senqu River headwaters in Lesotho to the Vaal Basin in South Africa.
Lesotho is of the opinion that international organizations could assist in
strengthening existing joint institutional mechanisms or in the establishment
of new mechanisms by providing third-party fairness in dealings from treaty
negotiation to reconciliation during construction and operation.
Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
48. Article 38(lc) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) states "the
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" as the third category of rules which
the Court must apply in accordance with its statute. The phrase, "general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations," refers to principles so general as to be applicable within all
systems of law. These general principles must be found in the municipal law of nations.
Michael Virally, The Sources of International Law, reprinted in Louis HEMKN ET At-, INTR-
NATIONAL LAW 88, 89 (2d ed. 1980). Since KOL and RSA share a common Roman-Dutch legal
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the words of Caponera, "general rules emphasize the interdependence of
states' interests in optimum utilization of the world's water resources in a
global perspective."49 Thus, the treaty contributes to the progressive
development of the law on transboundary resources.
Two issues raised during the negotiations deserve further
comment in order to gain support for the relational hypothesis posed in
this study. Some observers have suggested that, to some extent, KOL was
coerced into the present treaty because RSA always raised the possibility
of developing an alternative project without KOL's participation.s' Also,
RSA has used strong-arm tactics like economic blockades against Lesotho
and harassment of residents in the capital 1 These observations suggest
that the treaty may be 'unequal', in which case the 'relational' thesis
pursued in this paper would be undermined.' The suggestion of an
'unequal' treaty is untenable for the following reasons. First, consider the
tradition, the identification of general principles in interpreting their treaty becomes less
onerous.
49. Caponera, supra note 1, at 587.
50. In 1984, South Africa withdrew from the scheme as part of a campaign to
persuade Lesotho to sign a nonaggression pact .... Despite the obvious
economic difficulties faced by Lesotho by this action, it is not totally without
some choice. This is because regional friends of Lesotho initiated plans for
an alternative scheme. [Mlembers of the [SADCC] revived the Oxbow
hydroelectric project as an alternative to [LHWP]. Even though the Oxbow
scheme would not meet all of Lesotho's needs (only 60%), it shows that
Lesotho is not totally without alternatives.
Susan Turner, Lesotho: The Economy, in AFRIcA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA 1990 593 (19th ed. 1989).
See also BULLETIN supra note 14, at 114 (on the issue of coercion prior to 1993).
51. A report issued prior to 1991 states:
South Africa has launched murder raids, kidnappings and some sabotage
attacks against South African refugees and their friends. Nearly 500 deaths
have resulted during the years 1980-88. Economic costs of South African
aggression may reach between $75 million and $100 million for the 1980-88
period. Excess defense spending during this period approaches $75 to $100
million, while GDP loss amounts to between $250 and $300 million.
UNrED NATIONS DP'T oF Pu. INFOwRmATION, SOUTH AFRICAN DESrABnZATION: THE
EcONOMIc CosT oF FRONTLINE RESTANcE To APARTHEID, PRESS SUMMARY 8 (Oct. 14,1989).
52. One legal scholar has described unequal treaties as "treaties which are not concluded
on the basis of mutual recognition of the equality and sovereignty of the contracting states,
and which do not contain the crucial element of reciprocity where rights are conferred and
obligations imposed... .- PTm WSLEY-SMI, UNEQUAL TREATY, 1898-1997: CHINA, GREAT
BRITAIN AND HONG KONG'S TmIroRIES 3 (1980). Note that the concept of 'equality' as used
In international law means legal equality and not political equality. Legal equality, in turn,
means that: (1) states, whatever political influence they may have or whatever size they may
be, are all alike before international law; and (2) states shall have the same capacity to exercise
their rights and to assume obligations. See Ingrid Detter, The Problem of Unequal Treaties, 15
IW'L & COMP. L.Q. 1069,1070 (1966).
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two options available to RSA with respect to getting water to the critical
PWV region:5
1. Capture the Senqu River in Lesotho and let the water flow
by gravity into the Vaal Dam in the PWV area; to be known
as the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP). The supply
to the Vaal Dam in this case will be under the control of
Lesotho.
2. Let the water flow southwestward out of Lesotho to join
the Orange River in South Africa and then pump it back up
along the Vaal River System to be the Vaal Dam in the PWV
area, to be known as the Orange Vaal Transfer System-OVTS
(see Map). In this case South Africa will be in control of the
source of supply.
The OVTS costs would entail very high pumping costs.' There are no
estimates of how these high pumping costs would affect the price of
domestic and industrial water in the PWV area, but water price increases
could be substantial s Second, it is important to recognize that negotiations
for the treaty have been on-going for over three decades, including the
period when apartheid had thick skin, and seemingly impervious to
international pressure.' There are no rational reasons for the RSA to
engage in such a lengthy negotiation process, especially when it has the
military and economic might to impose its will. The more rational inference
is that RSA considered a relational treaty to be a cheaper alternative to a
coerced and 'unequal' treaty. The high cost of controlling violence and
disruption of social life within its own borders during the period, could
easily factor in RSA's calculus regarding its ability to cheaply police an
extra-territorial water project. Thirdly, the treaty is littered with language
from which one could infer that, RSA's overriding concern in the treaty is
KOL'S ability to deliver what is promised. If a coercive or 'unequal' treaty
was intended, it would have been unnecessary to expend the time and
53. There are four possible combinations based on the two options: (1) a Lesotho
Highland Water Project (LHWP) only for various yields up to 70 m3/s. (based in Lesotho);
(2) an Orange-Vaal Transfer Scheme (OVIS) as a follow-on to LHWP with various yields
(OVTS based in RSA); (3) combinations of LHWP and OVTS to yield 70 m3/s. (OVTS based
in RSA, LHWP based in Lesotho); and (4) OVTS with a yield of 70 m3/s (based in RSA). Cost
of any of the options based in RSA would be significantly higher than the option based in
KOL alone. See Feasibility Study, supra note 5, at 4-7. Note that the four options discussed
above represent only the options reported in the feasibility study report. Actually, "more than
2,000 variants of several alternatives were evaluated before the final proposals were made."
JOINT PERMANENT TECHNICAL COMMISSION 0PTC), LEo0 HIGHLANDS PROJECT (1990).
54. See supra text accompanying note 16.
55. See supra discussion note 13.
56. See Young, supra note 44, at 593.
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resources to incorporate the extensive procedural and substantive rules
aimed at ensuring performance under the treaty.
Another issue which consumed a lot of bargaining time and,
according to some observers almost scuttled the whole treaty, was the issue
of control of the 'tap': which party actually controls the flow of water.'
RSA expressed concerns about KOL's ability to ensure the security of the
source of supply, referring to the constant guerrilla attacks on another
project-the Cunene Dam.ss The problem was resolved by allowing each
party to be responsible for that part of the project located in its territory,
granting access for personnel from RSA to those parts of the water
conveyance system situated in Lesotho. Personnel from RSA are to
maintain a close liaison with KOL personnel to ensure the proper
implementation, operation, and maintenance of that part of the conveyance
system located in Lesotho. The joint control of the 'tap' is essentially a least-
cost solution to an otherwise difficult bargaining issue and represents an
effort on the part of the participants to achieve a relational governance
structure. -w
c. Policing Costs
In a sense, the KOL-RSA treaty was given a life of its own so as to
protect it from potentially subversive domestic legislation. This was
accomplished by setting up three new institutions specifically tailored to
deal with the implementation and monitoring of the project. The internal
57. See Turner, supra note 50, at 593.
58. The reference is to a hydroelectric and water scheme on the Cunene on the Namibian
and Angolan border. There is also the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric scheme on the Zambezi
River. South African officials expressed a lot of concern about the security problems with the
Lesotho scheme because both the Cunene and Cahora schemes have not functioned too well
due to armed conflict in the area. In fact, the security problems were among the thorniest
during the treaty negotiations. See Africa Inst. of South Africa, supra note 14.
59. The provisions on "access" are tantamount to the creation of a servitude. The
essential elements of an international servitude were summarized by the Representative of
the United States in the North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration in 1910 as follows:
[tihe real right must belong to a nation; it must be a permanent right; it must
be one which makes the territory of one state serve the uses and purposes of
another state; and it must be restrictive of river banks and international
railway connections, rights of fishery and navigation of national waterways,
rights to draw on such waterways for the purposes of irrigation or the
generation of hydroelectric power are examples of active servitudes. Rights,
on the other hand, to the neutralization or demilitarization of a territory,
rights of support, such as the rights of a state to extend a hydroelectric dam
across a boundary river, are examples of passive servitudes.
Yimer Fisseha, State Succssion and the Legal Status of International Rivers, in THE LEGAL REGIME
OP WrERNATIONAL Rrw AND LAKF 183 (Ralph Zacklin & Lucius Caflisch eds., 1981).
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structure and operation of these institutions encourage the use of risk
reducing strategies, low transaction costs in project management, and the
prevention of opportunism by contracting parties. The provisions
governing these institutional mechanisms are spread throughout the body
of the treaty, and are emphasized specifically in the procedural rules
outlined in the treaty. Furthermore, the provisions governing the method
of sharing benefits under the treaty (royalty payments) and for the
settlement of disputes lend support to the relational objectives of the
parties because they are structured to allow each party to easily determine
gains under the treaty. A critical analyses of the structure and functions of
the institutions created to monitor the water transfer treaty, the rules for
sharing benefits, and strategies for settling disputes under the treaty is that
these varied provisions collectively define a treaty policing system based
on threats and rewards to achieve the desired relational governance
regime.
a. The Lesotho Highland Development Authority (LHDA)
Article 6 Section 4 of the Treaty mandates the formation, under the
laws of the Kingdom of Lesotho, of an autonomous statutory body to be
called the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority (LHDA). It is
managed and controlled by a Board of Directors appointed by Lesotho. The
Board is responsible for setting the policies of LIDA to be implemented by
a Chief Executive, also appointed by Lesotho.' The Chief Executive is
charged with several responsibilities including the preparation of proposals
concerning the internal administration and procedures of LHDA;
preparation of budgets for LHDA subject to the approval of the Board of
Directors and the Joint Permanent Technical Commission (PTC);
controlling expenditures and borrowings of LHDA within limits set by the
Board; responsibility for all agreements and contracts on behalf of LHDA;
staff appointments to LHDA; and any other duties the Board of Directors
may assign from time to time. 1 The total membership of the Board of
60. The power to regulate water use in Lesotho is conferred on the Ministry of Water,
Energy and Mining (WEMMIN) under the WATER REsouRcEs Act oF 1978, No. 22 (1978)
(Lesotho). Prior to the establishment of WEMMIN, the Ministry of Works was responsible for
Water Project Development. There are five departments within WEMMIN, two of which are
directly involved with water issues. These are the Department of Water Affairs and the Water
and Sewerage Branch. LHDA presumably will be another addition to the various departments
under WEMMIN. For background and operation of WEMMIN, see Central Planning Office,
Lesotho: First Five-Year Development Plan, 1970/71-1974/75 188 (1970). Subsequent
Development Plans for Lesotho also discuss changing responsibilities of WEMMIN and its
departments.
61. Treaty, supra note 5, arts. 36,37, 38a-g, 39,40.
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Directors is not specified in the treaty document and presumably is to be
determined by agreement in the implementing statutes.
The responsibilities, powers, and modus operandi of LHDA are set
out in great detail under Article 7, consisting of 40 subsections. The overall
thrust of the provisions governing LHDA is to avoid sources of friction that
might impair Lesotho's ability to live up to its commitment under the
treaty. This was done by entrusting total responsibility to LHDA for both
water deliveries to RSA and hydroelectric power generation in Lesotho.
The output of LHDA was in effect tied to the benefits accruing to both RSA
and Lesotho under the treaty. To ensure that LHDA performs, Article 7
details reporting requirements, maintenance of minimum flows in rivers
and water levels in dams, prior submission of operational plans, and a
detailed system of inter-reservoir water transfers so as to meet negotiated
output levels. 2
Recognizing the immense managerial expertise needed for a project
of this magnitude, the treaty provisions outline specific management
procedures to guide LHDA's performance. These include the establishment
of a comprehensive management information system, performance of its
functions in accordance with internationally recognized standards of
managerial and technical competence, expertise and practice and review of
its performance by the JPTC.' The parties also imposed strict cost
accounting rules on all the various agencies charged with implementation
of the treaty. The rules cover the apportionment of costs between KOL and
RSA; the establishment of separate accounts for water delivery,
hydroelectric power generation, and social development projects (tourism,
irrigation, fisheries, and potable water supply), and the designation of
depositories for all monies."
To protect against the tendency of some governments to charge the
so-called "social" interest rate to quasi-governmental entities, the treaty
requires all funds to be deposited at market related interest rates and all
interest accruing on monies in an individual account to be utilized
exclusively for the implementation, operation, and maintenance of that part
62. When the water transfer project is fully developed it will consist of five major dams
ranging from 126 m to 180 m in height with a total active storage capacity of some 6,5 km3;
a smaller dam, 55 m high, forming the tailpond of the hydroelectric power-station; a total of
225 an of tunnels; three pumping stations; two power-stations with a total installed capacity
of some 110 MW; new or upgraded access roads totalling 650 an in length. See JOINT
PMANENT TCNICAL COMMION, LsrHo HIGHLANDS PROJcr 5 (1990).
63. The structure and functions of the Joint Permanent Technical Committee are
discussed in greater detail at infm Part l1(c)(ii).
64. Treaty, supra note 5, art. 29.
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of the project for which the monies bearing such interest were obtained.'
It is clear from the language of the treaty that the project is to proceed on
market efficiency principles, leaving little or no room for political prices
inconsistent with market efficiency. LHDA is also required under the treaty
to take out insurance against all loss or damages on the basis of normal
commercial considerations.
b. The Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority (TCTA)
A companion organization to LHDA is the Trans-Caledon Tunnel
Authority (TCTA). TCTA is to be responsible for the implementation,
operation, and maintenance of those parts of the project located in the RSA
and for monitoring the quantity of water delivered to RSA under the treaty.
The responsibilities, powers, and modus operandi of TCTA are set out in
Article 8, consisting of 20 subsections. Most of the provisions governing
TCTA parallel those of LHDA, specifically provisions on accounting
requirements, managerial requirements, pollution control, projections and
reporting requirements, cost plans, funding, and management of project
money. TCTA accounts shall be established with the South African Reserve
Bank and all market efficiency considerations for investments apply."
65. There is a tendency on the part of governments in developing countries to charge a
lower interest rate on loans to quasi-governmental entities, especially state-owned enterprises.
The interest rate is often below the prevailing market rate. The reason often given is that since
the state-owned enterprise is using the funds for the benefit of the whole society, a lower rate
is justifiable. The massive failures of state-owned enterprises in Africa suggests that the
practice of charging lower interest rates that do not reflect the cost of capital may be ill-
advised. For the rationale and use of "social" discount rates in project analysis, see generally
J. PRca GrrrlNGFu, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS (1982). The KOL-RSA
treaty emphasizes the use of market-based principles in financial dealings. See Treaty, supra
note 5, art. 7(29).
66. For provisions on money management see Treaty, supra note 5, arts. 27-31. The
requirement for spending money on particular parts of the project refers to expenditures on
the hydroelectric component versus expenditure for the water transfer component. The
provisions on money management also point to a desire on the part of KOL and RSA to
establish a relational treaty. Under the treaty, RSA assumes the debt-service obligations and
risk in respect to all loans raised for the water transfer component of the project. These
borrowings will be treated as an "enclave", separate from the other borrowings of KOL. This
bearing of risk by RSA means that KOL's borrowing capacity will not be limited or
constrained by water transfer related borrowings. This absence of risk, together with the
substantial increase in the infrastructure developments of the country means that KOL will
be able to utilize its borrowing capacity for developments the economic benefits of which will
accrue to Lesotho. See LESOTHo HIHLANnS DEVEWPMENT AUTHOaTrY (LHDA), LESOTHO
HIGHLANDS WATER PRCqECF (undated). To compare these concrete steps to protect Lesotho's
interests under the Treaty with the view that the Treaty represents an "unequal" arrangement,
see generally supra Section Ml.
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There are fewer provisions covering TCTA than LHDA and for
good reasons. Since LHDA is controlling the supply, fairly detailed and
technical rules are set out to define the quantity of water and how this
water is to be delivered to RSA. Another reason for the much longer
provisions covering LHDA may be that, unlike the provisions covering
TCTA, the treaty spells out the duties, responsibilities, and reporting
requirements for the Board of Directors and the Chief Executive of LHDA.
This extreme detailing may be due to the fact that the object of the treaty is
located in Lesotho but, more importantly, corporate practice and behavior
in RSA is very well established. It may therefore be unnecessary to list in
specific detail, expectations for the Board of Directors of TCTA.'
c. The Joint Permanent Technical Commission (PTC)
In order to coordinate the activities of LHDA and TCTA, the treaty
mandates the formation of a Joint Permanent Technical Commission GJPTC)
to be composed of two delegations. Each party is to nominate three
representatives as well as an alternate for each of the nominated
representatives. Chairmanship of the JFTC is to be on a rotation basis. The
JPTC possesses full legal personality in the territory of each party and is not
subject to legal action in the territory of either party. Members of the JPTC
are of the rank of diplomats in each party's country and enjoy full
diplomatic immunity.' The offices of the JPTC shall be in Maseru, the
capital of Lesotho, and the JPTC is to maintain a bank account with a bank
in Lesotho. Costs associated with the functioning of the JPTC shall be
shared equally by the parties with each party responsible for the costs of its
own delegation. The JPTC has monitoring and advisory powers for the
delivery of water to RSA and for hydroelectric power generation in
Lesotho. It has monitoring powers over the activities of LHDA and TCTA
and it shall establish its own rules of procedures including the necessary
regulations with regard to meetings, technical, administrative, and
financial activities.'
67. The argument presented here is that risk of failure of the agreement lies more with
Lesotho than with South Africa. South Africa may violate the agreement only by delaying
payments or some form of economic blockade as it has done in the past. However, for
Lesotho, risk of failure may be due to technical, managerial, or political decisions. The
detailed provisions covering LHDA are intended to deal with these contingencies.
68. See generally Treaty, supra note 5, at annexure IUL
69. See Treaty, supra note 5, arts. 4, 5, 6. The JPTC is intended to be an impartial,
autonomous body. This means their decisions are not influenced in any way by the position
of their respective governments on an issue. However, since under Article 9, Paragraph 2
either party may terminate the nomination of its representative on the JPTC with a 30-day
notice to the other party, a representative to the JPTC is not altogether immune from political
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Subsection 11 lists fifteen specific decisions by LHDA and TCTA
that require approval by JPTC in order to take effect. These include the
appointment of auditors and consultants, approval of budgets,
implementation plans for various phases of the project, operating and
maintenance plans, tender procedures and tender documents, allocation of
costs between parties, financing and loan arrangements, review of
accounting and management in formation systems, establishment of
accounts with banking institutions, insurance and foreign exchange issues,
and the determination of the Nominal Annual Yield."
Subsection 14 of the Treaty states that "where a decision is one
concerning purely the generation of hydroelectric power in Lesotho or
purely for the delivery of water to RSA, approval of JPTC is not required."71
This is an attempt to restore some control to the contracting parties
regarding decisions that may be considered purely domestic. The rather
extensive powers of JPTC under Subsection 11 raise issues about the
sovereignty of the parties and, without a balancing provision, could make
the gathering of public support for the agreement difficult. For Lesotho,
where the payments from the treaty will be a major component of
government revenues, the approval requirement by a non-governmental
commission on what to do with their money is obviously objectionable. For
South Africa, with strong political parties, opposition may exploit
Subsection 14 as an example of the surrender of sovereignty to a much
smaller country.' The provisions of Subsection 14 shield such important
sovereign decisions and prerogatives from outside interference.
control. Only "good faith" adherence to the underlying principles of the treaty would prevent
such manipulation. Id. at art. 9(2).
70., Article I of the Treaty defines "Nominal Annual Yield" as "that quantity of water
determined from time to time in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph (5) of Article
7." Paragraph (5) Article 7 states, "The Lesotho Highlands Development Authority shall from
time to time establish the Nominal Annual Yield which shall be that quantity of water, the
annual delivery of which from the phases of the project implemented at that stage, can be
maintained continuously on a long-term basis with a reliability of ninety-eight per cent." Id.
at art. 1, 5(7). Once again, the effort to ensure credible performance and avoid opportunism
is demonstrated by the specificity of obligation under the treaty.
71. See text accompanying siqma note 58.
72. The importance of domestic support for effective implementation of a treaty has been
summarized as,
[a] major influence for observance of international law is the effective
acceptance of the law into national life and institutions. When international
law or some particular norm or obligation is accepted national law will
reflect it, the institutions and personnel of government will take account of
it, and the life of the people will absorb it. With acceptance comes
observance, then the habit and inertia of continued observance.
Lous HENION, How NATIONs BEHAVE, LAw AND FORmGN PoucY 81 (1979).
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d'. Royalty Payments
Under the treaty, the Republic of South Africa is to pay for water
in two ways: 1) payments for excess water, or 2) royalty payments.
Payments for water begin upon the implementation of sub-phase 1A of the
project. Under the treaty, sub-phase 1A entails the construction of storage
dams, delivery tunnels to convey water to designated outlet points in RSA,
and a hydroelectric power complex in Lesotho. Water deliveries from this
phase are to commence in the year 1995 and a total of 57 million cubic
meters of water is to be delivered73 The target delivery date was not
achieved and water is to be delivered by January 1997.7' This new delivery
date is the subject of discussion between the Parties as a result of a need to
line the entire transfer tunnel, which was not planned for in the original
document.7s Consistent with the relational thrust of the treaty, water
deliveries to RSA are tied to the development of hydroelectric power in
Lesotho in order to reduce a party's incentive to shirk its responsibility. 6
The royalty provisions are fairly detailed but perhaps their most important
characteristics are the scattered indications from the language of the treaty
of a desire on the part of the contracting parties to enter into a stable
relationship. For example, the royalty provisions in the treaty are tied to
another much older treaty arrangement between the parties, The Southern
Africa Customs Union (SACU)." RSA's share of the common revenue pool
73. See supra note . See also Treaty, supra note 5, at annexure 1(2).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. The idea of tying the benefits of the project to ensure performance is clearly intended
by the scheduling of various phases of the project.
77. Treaty, supra note 5, art. 12(3). The SACU agreement dates as far back as 1910 when
the Union (now Republic) of South Africa was established. The most recent SACU agreement,
made in 1969, provides for payments to Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho (the BSL countries)
to be made on the basis of their share of goods imported by SACU countries, multiplied by
an "enhancement" factor of 1.42 as a form of compensation from the BSL countries' loss of
freedom to conduct a completely independent economic policy and for the costs that this
restriction involves in trade diversion and loss of investment SACU revenue is paid two years
in arrears and earns no interest, but for Lesotho it has formed up to 70 percent of government
recurrent revenues in recent years In Lesotho's 1986/1987 budget SACU revenue was
projected at M147m or 61 percent of total recurrent revenue of M241.2m. The SACU
agreement of 1969 requires that parties seek South African approval before entering into any
other trading arrangement. Thus, when the BSL countries wanted to join PTA, the South
African government objected that the PTA Treaty discriminated in that it specifically called
for a "reduction of BSL dependence on South Africa." Later, South Africa agreed to the BSL
countries joining the PTA provided there was "no conflict in any way" with the SACU
agreement. D. Anglin, Economic Liel ion and Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: SADCC
and PTA 4 IN'L ORG. 681-711 (1983) [hereinafter Economic Liberation]. See also D. Anglin,
SADCC after Nkomati, 84 Amg AFr. 163 (1985).
[Vol. 38
LESOTHO'S WATER TRANSFER TREATY
of SACU is considered an advance payment to Lesotho under the water
treaty and Lesotho's share of the common revenue pool is used as a set off
against Lesotho's share of the investment element of the net benefits.? In
effect, an impairment of SACU will also impair payments under the current
treaty. By linking SACU, the trade arrangement, and the water treaty,
opportunism may be further reduced because both the RSA and KOL
derive considerable revenues from the trade arrangement.
Another relational characteristic of the royalty clause is that RSA
agrees to pay Lesotho royalties in cash regardless of water quantity
delivered plus a unit cost component based on each cubic foot of water
delivered. The payment provision allows Lesotho to plan its economic
development on a firmer basis since there is some security of expectations
as to future revenues. The fixed payments are adjusted only when Lesotho
fails to deliver the required amount of water. Where this failure comes
under the provisions of Article 14 dealing with situations of "Force
Majeure," fixed payments would continue and the shortfalls due to the
unforeseen circumstances would be made up once normality is restored.7
The resolution of disputes about royalties also points to a desire on the part
of the parties to enter into a relational treaty. The JPTC is responsible for
settling disputes on royalties and, pending the resolution of any dispute,
RSA is to make payments on the best possible estimate by the JPTC.' Any
adjustments to disputed amounts shall be reflected in subsequent invoices.
In effect, payments do not cease when there is a dispute. Since RSA is
making advance payments for the fixed components of the net benefits, one
may conclude that, with some good faith, the potential to hold payments
to Lesotho hostage is very significantly reduced. The Reserve Bank of RSA
is to make available to Lesotho convertible foreign exchange for any foreign
transactions that Lesotho authorizes from the proceeds of royalty payments
or any other payments. The language of Paragraph 27 of Article 12 seems
to suggest that the use of the foreign exchange requested from RSA is not
78. Treaty, supra note 5, art 12(11-12). See generally D. Anglin, Economic Liberation, supra
note 77. References cited by Anglin are especially useful.
79. Basically, where the project is canceled for some other reason than a unilateral
cancellation by RSA or KOL, net benefits would be computed as if the project had been
performed up to the point of cancellation, including projected performance. The computation
of benefits in this case excludes the hydropower component. Thus, if Lesotho were to cancel
the project, it could bear substantial costs equal to the cost of complete performance. The
Force Majuere clause in the treaty relieves both parties of their obligations under the
agreement if nonperformance is due to causes which are outside the control of either party,
and could not be avoided by exercise of due care. Force Majuere clauses have their origins in
the Law of Insurance. See BIA(J'S LAW DICIONARY 330 (5th ed. 1983).
80. Treaty, supra note 5, at art. 19.
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restricted to purchases connected with the project." Again, the sovereign
right of Lesotho to use its resources for any purpose is not impaired by its
dealings with the Reserve Bank of RSA.
e. The Prevention and Settlement of Disputes
The provisions governing the settlement of disputes under the
treaty is further evidence of the desire on the part of the parties to enter
into a long-term sustainable relationship. The procedures may also serve
as a model for other countries on the continent that may seek to negotiate
rules about natural resources shared by other countries.
The provisions begin with a reminder of the overriding preference
for conciliation in the spirit of the goals set out in the Preamble. The initial
provisions also emphasize dispute avoidance. In the event of a dispute's
arising, LHDA or TCTA may request the JPTC to conduct an investigation
and present its written recommendations to the parties. The JPTC is to
conclude its investigation within 14 days or else request an extension of
time for consideration of the matter. The JPTC may recommend the proper
action to be taken at the end of its investigations or may recommend
recourse to more formal procedures.'
Where a dispute is not resolved based on the actions and
recommendations of the JPTC, the dispute shall be made the subject of
negotiation between the parties.a If the issue is not resolved after
negotiation between the parties, it must be submitted to arbitration. Either
Lesotho or RSA or both may institute arbitration proceedings, upon serving
notice of existence of a dispute. The Arbitral Tribunal shall consist of three
arbitrators--each party shall select one arbitrator and the third arbitrator,
who shall be the President of such Tribunal, shall be appointed by
agreement between the two arbitrators appointed by the parties. In a
situation where the arbitrators appointed by the parties are unable to select
the third arbitrator, the President of the International Commission on Large
Dams (ICOLD) shall, at the request of either party, appoint someone as
81. The Treaty states, "South Africa shall cause the South African Reserve Bank to make
available to Lesotho through the Central Bank of Lesotho freely convertible foreign exchange
at its most favorable exchange rates for any foreign transactions that Lesotho authorizes from
the proceeds of royalty payments and payments in terms of Paragraph (18)." Treaty, supra
note 5, at art. 12(27). Payments under Paragraph (19) consist of payments for excess water
delivered. Note that this provision differs from those under Article 7 Paragraphs 28-30
controlling the use of funds by LHDA. Id., art. 12(19), 7(28-30).
82. Treaty, supra note 5, at art. 16(10(a)). Provisions on arbitration are covered under
Paragraphs 9-16 of Article 16. Id. at art. 16(9-16).
83. Id.
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President of such Tribunal." The individual selected may not be a citizen
of Lesotho or RSA.
The provisions on arbitration raise questions about a nation's
sovereign right to refuse to be a Party to a judicial or arbitral proceeding.
To address this question, Paragraph 10(c) of Article 16 authorizes the
President of the Arbitral Tribunal to appoint the other arbitrator, where one
party initiates the arbitration process and the other party, even though duly
notified, refuses to nominate the one other arbitrator within sixty calendar
days.ss In this case, provisions under paragraph 10(b) will apply and the
President himself is to be appointed by the President of ICOLD." In effect,
a party may not frustrate the arbitral process by refusing to appoint or
nominate an arbitrator. Even though these provisions may be interpreted
as demonstrating the parties' desire to keep the treaty viable, the
implications for the sovereign rights of the parties may be far reaching.'
The Arbitral Tribunal has authority to determine the time and venue for its
work, rules of procedure, competence, jurisdiction, and necessary
personneL
Decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal shall be by a majority both of the
members and, in the event of there being no majority vote, the President
shall have a casting vote in addition to a deliberative vote. Both Lesotho
and RSA are entitled to a fair hearing before the Tribunal and a failure to
respond or appear before the Tribunal may lead to a default judgment
against the party. The decision of the Arbitral Tribunal is binding on the
parties, and the parties are required under the treaty to expeditiously give
effect to the decision of the Arbitral TribunaL Any dispute about an award
is to be referred back to the Arbitral Tribunal within sixty calendar days of
the rendering of the award.'
84. Id. at art. 16(15). The structure of the Arbitral Tribunal is fairly standard practice. See,
e.g., Article 12 of the Air Transport Agreement between the United States and Italy, Feb. 6,
1948,62 Stat. 3729, T.I.A.S. No. 1902,73 U.N.TS. 113.
85. Treaty, supra note 5, at art. 16(10(b)).
86. Id.
87. As harsh as the arbitration provisions may sound, they are useful in avoiding
potential conflicts and impasse and, in this sense, may serve as a useful example for other
countries on the continent. For example, contrast the outcome in the absence of this type of
provision in the Shalt-AL-ARAB treaty, "refusal by one party to appoint a member of the
arbitral commission may prevent the birth of the Arbitration Committee." Elihu Lauterpacht,
River Boundaries: Legal Aspects of the SHALT-AL-ARAB Frontier, 9 INr'L & COMw. L. Q. 208,
208-36 (1960).
88. Decisions and the binding force of an arbitral award are effective only to the extent
that parties do intend to be bound. Under the Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure, the validity
of an award may be challenged by either party on one or more of the following grounds that-
a. The tribunal has exceeded its powers,
b. There was corruption on the part of a member of the tribunal,
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The specific objective of this paper was to analyze the recent water
transfer treaty between the Republic of South Africa and the Kingdom of
Lesotho within the transaction cost paradigm of institutional economics. A
broader objective, however, was to suggest that, given the inherent
problems with transboundary resources, agreements to share these
resources should be relational rather than transactional because relational
arrangements reduce risk of failure, transaction costs, and opportunism.
Furthermore, for developing countries with an uneven distribution of
natural resources, sharing of transboundary resources may one day be the
most effective way to improve the welfare of people. The RSA-KOL treaty
was analyzed to show how two countries with vastly uneven distribution
of resources have been able to negotiate a treaty to share a common
resource to the benefit of its citizens. Examples of purely or mainly
transactional treaties in the resource sharing field are hard to find: it is
more likely that a resource sharing treaty would include both relational
and transactional characteristics. However, it was necessary to draw a clear
distinction between relational and transactional governance structures in
the case of the RSA-KOL treaty given the very unstable political environ-
ment within which treaty negotiations took place." Even though it may
c. There has been a failure to state the reasons for the award or a serious
departure from a fundamental rule of procedure, and/or
d. The undertaking to arbitrate or the compromise is a nullity.
See INERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIAIS 853 (Henkin et aL eds., 1980).
89. A comparison of the terms of this treaty with those of an earlier one between RSA and
Portugal will serve to illustrate the relational thrust of the current treaty. The RSA-Portugal
treaty dealt with a similar subject matter as the RSA-KOL treaty. The objective of the RSA-
Portugal treaty was for the joint utilization of the water resources of the Cunene River Basin
and part of the project was the generation of hydroelectric power and the provision of
irrigation water to Southwest Africa, then under South African mandate. In the treaty,
however, South Africa's interest was monetized and implied that its participation with
Portugal was to be transactional. Article 4.1.9 states, "notwithstanding South Africa's financial
participation, ownership of the entire works shall rest in the Portuguese authorities." There was
no mention of regional cooperation and anticipated benefits were quite specific and restricted
to a geographical area. This contrasts with the RSA-KOL treaty where ownership is mutual
and anticipated benefits extend beyond the borders of the contracting parties. See United
Nations, Treaties Concerning the Utilization of International Water Courses for other Purposes than
Navigation. Africa, under title. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of South Africa
and the Government of Portugal in Regard to the First Phase of Development of the Water Resources
of the Cunene River Basin (21 January 1969); Natural Resources/Water Series No. 13
ST/ESA/131 (1984). Even though there is no information available regarding the entry into
force of this agreement, there exists a hydroelectric and water scheme on the Cunene on the
Namibian and Angolan border.
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still be too early to determine the stability of the commitments under the
treaty, the theoretical approach and evidence based on the language of the
treaty suggest that the potential for conflict is greatly minimized through
the creation of a relational structure.
